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Unfortunately, the mathematics and operationalization of the con- 
cepts of cohesion and equivalence have received considerably more 
attention from network analysts than have the concepts’ empirical 
correlates. Despite some important recent works, we have surprisingly 
little knowledge of the conditions under which these sources of social 
homogeneity operate. 
This problem became evident to me during a study of the political 
behavior of 57 large US corporations (Mizruchi 1992). An important 
predictor of similarity of political behavior between firms was whether 
they shared interlocking board members. Among the five dependent 
variables on which I focused, however, the extent to which firms 
shared indirect interlocks through financial institutions was in all but 
one case a stronger predictor of similarity of behavior than was the 
existence of direct ties between the firms. ’ In the fifth case, the effect 
of indirect ties was slightly stronger than that of direct ties. 2 
The primary interpretation that I attached to this finding was that it 
demonstrated that structural equivalence was a stronger predictor of 
similarity of political behavior than was cohesion. This plunged me 
into the debates among network analysts over the effects of cohesion 
and structural equivalence on social homogeneity (Friedkin 1984; Burt 
1987). But the difficulties and ambiguities in untangling these two 
variables have led me to consider role equivalence as an alternative 
source of homogeneity. In this paper I discuss the role of cohesion 
and structural equivalence in corporate political behavior. I examine 
alternative operationalizations of cohesion and structural equivalence 
and the relation between one’s conclusions about the role of these two 
factors and one’s operational definitions of them. I then discuss the 
concept of role equivalence and the extent to which it provides a 
solution to this issue. I argue that a measure of role equivalence based 
on actors’ network prominence may be an important predictor of 
homogeneity in sparse, highly stratified networks. 
’ An interlocking directorate occurs when a member of the board of one firm sits on the board 
of another. An indirect interlock occurs when members of the boards of two firms sit together on 
the board of a third firm. 
’ Four of the five dependent variables were based on campaign contributions of corporate 
political action committees. The fifth was based on content coding of corporate testimony before 
congressional committees. 
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Background 
Most analyses of social influence have assumed that influence occurs 
primarily through direct relations between actors. This principle is 
traceable to Durkheim. In The Diuision of Labor in Society (1893), 
Durkheim argued that the interdependence among actors and the 
correspondingly high rates of social interaction (dynamic density) were 
the primary sources of solidarity in modern society. Later, in Suicide 
(18971, Durkheim reasoned that suicide was less likely to occur among 
Catholics and married adults than among Protestants and single 
adults because of the social ties shared by members of the former 
groups. 
The importance of cohesive relations between actors became an 
explicit component of network analysis and an implicit component of 
much contemporary sociological research. In the field of social sup- 
port, for example, a substantial tradition exists in which supportive 
social relations are viewed as contributing to both physical and mental 
health (House 1987; Litwak and Messeri 1989). The importance of 
networks in contributing to social well-being in urban communities 
has also been well established (Fischer 1982; Wellman et al. 1988). 
The focus on direct relations between actors has played a useful role 
in our understanding of social well-being, But to what extent do direct 
relations contribute to social homogeneity, including the similarity of 
behavior? The classic studies of voting behavior by Lazarsfeld and his 
colleagues (for example, Lazarsfeld et al. 1944) emphasized the effects 
of one’s social contacts in influencing one’s voting behavior. The 
concept of ‘cross-pressures,’ for example, was developed to account 
for situations in which persons were subject to conflicting social 
pressures. 3 In their study of the adoption of tetracycline by physicians 
in four Illinois communities, Coleman et al. (1966) found that physi- 
cians were more likely to adopt the drug when those with whom they 
communicated socially or professionally also adopted it. 
3 A well-known tendency in American politics since the Great Depression has been for working 
class and Catholic voters to support Democrats and for middle class and Protestant voters to 
support Republicans. Lazarsfeld et al. found that working class Protestants and middle class 
Catholics were less likely to vote than were working class Catholics and middle class Protestants. 
They attributed this to the conflicting social pressures faced by members of the former groups. 
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These studies suggest that social homogeneity is a result of influ- 
ence between actors primarily owing to communication. The assump- 
tion is that social pressure by one or more actors upon another 
influences the latter’s behavior. If this is the case, then a sizeable 
component of human behavior can be understood by an examination 
of the individuals with whom a person comes into contact. 
Most network analyses of the corporate community have also oper- 
ated with this assumption. Studies of the role of interlocks in forging 
class cohesion have assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that cohesion is 
established by the social ties and obligations that occur through 
continued contact. The training in elite prep schools and colleges, the 
membership in the same elite social clubs, and the contact that is both 
cause and consequence of within-group marriage are viewed by many 
theorists as mechanisms of class solidarity (Zeitlin 1974; Ratcliff 1980; 
Domhoff 1983; Useem, 1984). Network theorists with a less explicit 
focus on social class have operated with similar assumptions (Alba and 
Kadushin 1976; Moore 1979; Alba and Moore 1983). Recent works on 
corporate philanthropy (Galaskiewicz 198.5) and the generation of 
health and energy policy (Laumann and Knoke 1987) have also 
operated from within a cohesion framework. These arguments employ 
a logic similar to that in the studies by Lazarsfeld et al. and Coleman 
et al. 
The assumptions behind my early work on interlocks (Mizruchi 
1982) were similar to those of the above studies. If political cohesion 
were a result of interlock ties between firms, it was partly due, I 
assumed, to the role of communication among business elites in 
creating similar political views. This led me to hypothesize that inter- 
locked firms would be more likely than non-interlocked firms to 
engage in similar political behavior. 
There is, however, another source of homogeneity posited by net- 
work analysts, what Lorrain and White (1971) called ‘structural equiv- 
alence’. Structurally equivalent actors are those with identical rela- 
tions to all other actors in a social system. Thus, two individuals in a 
50-person network who both know the same five people and do not 
know the other 43 people are defined as structurally equivalent. 
Because this definition is overly stringent for the identification of 
similar actors, the requirement of complete equivalence is usually 
relaxed in actual analyses. Instead, a certain level of equivalence is 
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viewed as sufficient for simultaneous classification into a particular 
block. 
White and his colleagues employed the concept of structural equiv- 
alence primarily as a means of describing in detail the characteristics 
of various social structures. 4 Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, 
Ron Burt began adapting the concept to the study of social homo- 
geneity. Burt (1982) argued that social homogeneity could result not 
only from direct pressure among actors but also from actors perform- 
ing according to the socially defined dictates of their social roles. 
According to Burt (1982), structurally equivalent actors could be 
viewed as ‘joint occupants’ of social positions. Every social structure 
consists of positions whose occupants have a particular level of ‘struct- 
ural autonomy’, the ability to pursue their objectives without con- 
straint. Occupants of a position have structural autonomy to the 
extent that there is little competition within their position and high 
levels of competition among occupants of positions on which the 
former depend. In Burt’s model, joint occupants of a position compete 
with one another for favor with occupants of other positions. As a 
result, any action that ego takes that might be viewed favorably by an 
occupant of another position is likely to be emulated by other occu- 
pants of ego’s position. Thus, according to Burt, it is not cohesion or 
mutual influence that leads occupants of similar positions to behave 
similarly, but competition for the favor of occupants of other social 
positions. 
This argument led Burt to predict that structurally equivalent actors 
would be more likely to behave similarly than would cohesive actors, 
which he defined (1983: 272) as those with ‘strong, intense relations’. 
His re-analysis of data from the studies by Coleman et al. (Burt 1987) 
and GalaSkieWiCz (Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991) as well as his own 
data (Burt 1982, ch. 6) suggested that actors grouped together on the 
basis of structural equivalence were more likely to behave similarly 
than were those grouped together on the basis of cohesion. s 
4 See Breiger et at. (19751, White ef al. (19761, and Arabie et al. (1978) for detailed presenta- 
tions of this approach. 
’ In a study of North Carolina crab fishermen, Johnson (1986) found additional support for 
Burt’s argument. Johnson did not compare the structural equivalence model directly with the 
cohesion model, however. 
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Controversies 
There are two primary objections to Burt’s interpretation. First, some 
researchers (especially Alba and Kadushin 1976; Alba and Moore 
1983; Friedkin 1984) have argued that cohesion must be understood as 
an indirect as well as a direct process. In other words, the effect of 
cohesion cannot be understood simply in terms of direct relations 
between actors. Friedkin (1984) found that once two-step ties were 
viewed as indicative of cohesion, the effect of structural equivalence 
on similarity disappeared. It should be noted, however, that Burt’s 
operationalization of cohesive cliques does take indirect ties into 
account. In addition, as I note below, Burt (1988) has recently argued 
that ties between actors should be measured in terms of their path 
distances, so that second, third, and higher-order ties are taken into 
account. 
The second criticism of Burt’s argument is that the structural 
equivalence effect that Burt attributes to competitive relations among 
joint occupants of a position could in fact be a result of a common set 
of social influence from the same group of alters. In other words, 
since structurally equivalent actors are by definition tied to the same 
third parties, they have multiple sources of common influence. If 
structural equivalence is a stronger predictor of homogeneity than is 
cohesion, it could be that the effect of several sources of common 
influence is greater than the effect of a single source of direct 
influence. Interestingly, in his earlier work, Burt (1983) suggested that 
both the role-taking and common influence views represented legiti- 
mate interpretations of structural equivalence. More recently, how- 
ever, he has rejected the common influence interpretation (Burt 1987: 
1293). 
One problem with this debate is that it is not possible at present to 
distinguish the effects of structural equivalence due to common sources 
of influence from those due to competition for the favor of similar 
alters, Knowledge of the motives underlying an actor’s behavior ap- 
pears necessary if we are to resolve this issue. Burt has argued that if 
common influence is the source of similar behavior, then direct as well 
as indirect ties between actors should contribute to similar behavior. 
As he put it (1987: 12931, “it seems wrong to attribute evidence of 
ego-alter contagion to indirect communication through shared con- 
tacts when there is no evidence when communization is direct”. But 
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this is not necessarily the case. The simultaneous influence of several 
common actors may indeed be more salient than the influence of one 
actor upon another. 
A second reason that makes it difficult to empirically distinguish 
the two models is that what is viewed as influence by one model might 
be defined as jockeying for position by the other. Consider, for 
example, two firms that are tied to several of the same banks and that 
behave similarly. The influence interpretation would suggest that the 
firms are both influenced by the banks. The competition interpreta- 
tion would suggest that the firms mimicked one another in order to 
curry favor with the banks. But regardless of whether the firms were 
directly influenced by the banks or whether they copied one another 
in order to appear in a favorable light, in both cases they find it 
necessary to behave in a certain way because of their need to gain 
favor with the banks. In other words, regardless of its origin, the 
behavior is a consequence of both firms’ dependence on the banks. ’ 
In the following section I examine the cohesion-structural equiva- 
lence controversy with respect to my data on corporate political 
behavior. I then discuss the extent to which the concept of role 
equivalence sheds light on the issue of similar political behavior 
among firms. 
Operationalizations of cohesion and structural equivalence 
I shall begin the analysis with a simple operationalization of cohesion 
and structural equivalence, both of which could be the subject of 
dispute. From these original definitions, I shall consider modifications 
and alternatives, both of the measures themselves and the ways they 
are interpreted. 
’ The existence of mimicry in response to mutual pressure from the banks might be especially 
likely to occur in cases in which the pressure was covert, latent, or anticipated. Firm A may 
decide that it believes that the bank would prefer that it institute dividend restrictions. Firm B, 
operating in an equally uncertain environment, might then decide to follow A and institute its 
own dividend restrictions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The crucial point is that the dividend 
restrictions are ultimately a response to the pressure, apparent or real, by the banks on firms A 
and B. 
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Cohesion 
Regardless of how cohesion is ultimately operationalized, most ob- 
servers would agree that actors with direct relations can be defined as 
cohesive, provided, of course, that the relations can be assumed to be 
positive ones. Even if such relations are not positive, they might still 
be viewed as cohesive. 7 I shall begin, then, by defining cohesion in 
terms of direct ties. Because the analyses in this paper focus on the 
political behavior of large corporations, my initial operationalization 
of cohesion will involve direct interlock ties between firms. 
Structural Equivalence 
The appropriate operational definition of structural equivalence is 
surrounded by controversy (Faust and Romney 1985; Burt 1986; Faust 
19881. Theoretically, structurally equivalent actors are those with 
identical (or similar) relations to other actors in the network. If we 
imagine a network with five actors and we ignore self-ties (as most 
researchers, including Arabie et al. (1978) and Burt (19821, have 
advocated), then actors A and B will be structurally equivalent if both 
have the same relations with actors C, D, and E. 
Structural equivalence has been measured in two primary ways. 
White and his colleagues operationalized structural equivalence by 
correlating the columns of the adjacency matrix. The higher the 
correlation coefficient between the columns associated with a pair of 
actors, the more structurally equivalent they were. Burt has advocated 
the use of Euclidean distance as a measure of structural equivalence. 
The computation of distances involves summing the squared differ- 
ences between the column entries for each actor. The larger the 
differences between column entries, the greater the distances between 
actors. Conversely, the smaller the differences between columns, the 
‘closer’ (that is, the more structurally equivalent) are two actors. 
’ As Williams (1970: 583) points out, “there is a wide range within which an important degree of 
cohesion, in the sense of coordinated activity, can be maintained by coercion, the effective threat 
of the few over the many [N]ot all cohesion rests on consensus or voluntary participation.” 
See Mizruchi (1990). 
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Under most conditions, the two measures should yield similar 
results. Actors whose column entries are similar should have small 
distances and high correlations. The situation in which the measures 
are most likely to differ is one in which wide discrepancies exist in the 
strength of the relations in which A and B are involved (Faust and 
Romney 1985). For example, if two firms are both tied and not tied to 
the same other firms, their column entries will be highly correlated. 
Using correlation as a measure, they will have a high level of struc- 
tural equivalence. If firm B has strong relations with the firms with 
which it is tied (for example, with large numbers of interlocks) while 
firm A has weaker relations (small numbers of interlocks), then the 
Euclidean distance between them may be high even if they are tied to 
the same firms. 
Whether one employs correlation coefficients or Euclidean dis- 
tances is an issue that is best decided by the substantive problem 
being addressed (Burt, 1986). In their cluster analysis of corporate 
political groupings, Neustadtl and Clawson (1988) demonstrate how 
this issue relates to the use of campaign contributions. If one is 
concerned with the impact of firms on elections, in which case the size 
of a firm’s contribution would be of considerable importance, then 
Euclidean distances would be a more appropriate indicator. If one is 
concerned with to whom the firms contribute regardless of the size of 
the contribution, then the use of correlation coefficients is the appro- 
priate technique. 
This discussion suggests that if one is concerned with a binary 
adjacency matrix, then correlations and Euclidean distances should 
yield similar results. Under such conditions, if one is concerned more 
with to whom a firm is tied than the strength of the tie, then the 
correlation coefficient should be a superior measure of structural 
equivalence. 
One issue that is treated differently by the two measures is the role 
of isolates, actors with no ties within the system. As Arabie et al. 
noted, it is impossible to compute a correlation coefficient for any 
actor that has exactly the same relation with all other actors in the 
system, since the column has no variance. Because isolates have 
columns with means of zero and no variance, it is impossible to 
compute a correlation coefficient for any relation involving an isolate, 
including one involving two isolates, whose relations to all other actors 
are identical. Employing Euclidean distance, however, enables one to 
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compute the distance between any pair of actors involving isolates, 
including cases of two isolates. In the latter case, the distance between 
the two isolates is zero. The question is whether isolates should be 
viewed as structurally equivalent. Would we expect high levels of 
homogeneity between pairs of isolated actors? 
Much of the answer appears to hinge on the character of the 
homogeneity under investigation. In Burt’s studies of innovation adop- 
tion, for example, two actors who do not adopt the innovation are 
viewed as behaving similarly. Since isolated actors tend not to adopt 
and since they also tend to be structurally equivalent, there is a 
tendency for structurally equivalent actors to behave similarly. With 
political contribution data, however, in which behavior is defined as 
similar only to the extent that firms contribute to particular candi- 
dates, relatively isolated firms, which tend to be relatively inactive, 
may be less likely to contribute to the same candidates, even though 
they may have high levels of structural equivalence. 
At this stage, I propose to handle the matter empirically. The 
following section briefly describes the data employed in the analysis. 
Data 
The data for the analysis are drawn from all 1596 dyadic relations 
between 57 large (Fortune 500) US manufacturing firms. These firms 
consist primarily of the three largest whose primary operations were 
within 19 major (two-digit) manufacturing industries. Details are pro- 
vided in Mizruchi (1989; 1992). 
The dependent variable, similarity of political behavior, is based on 
contributions to congressional candidates by corporate political action 
committees during the 1979-1980 election cycle. The variable is opera- 
tionalized as: 
sjj = rzij/(rz, * njy2 
where Sij = similarity, njj = the number of contributions in common, 
and yli and nj = the number of contributions made by firms i and j, 
respectively. This measure, which is identical to the measure of 
association employed in several studies of interlocking directorates 
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(Mizruchi 1982) provides an indicator of behavioral similarity that is 
independent of the number of contributions by each firm. * 
Director interlocks were computed by comparing lists of board 
members for all 57 firms. Two measures of indirect ties were em- 
ployed. The first involved the number of the 50 largest commercial 
banks and the 20 largest life insurance companies to which both firms 
are tied. The second involved ties with the same manufacturing firms 
within the sample. 
As I have already noted, it is impossible to empirically examine 
structural equivalence using correlation coefficients when there are 
isolates in the network. My analyses using a distance measure of 
equivalence revealed that omission of the isolates from the analysis 
had little effect on the results. Therefore, the analysis presented here 
will be based on the 990 dyads among the 45 firms that had at least 
one direct interlock with another firm in the sample. Both measures 
of structural equivalence as well as variations based on them will be 
employed. 
Cohesion and structural equivalence results 
Table 1 presents correlations among the measures employed in the 
analysis. Measures 7 through 13 will be discussed below. Variables 2 
and 3 are the number of direct interlock ties between firms and the 
number of indirect ties through financial institutions respectively. 
Measure 4 is the number of indirect ties between firms in the network 
through other firms in the network. Measure 5 is the structural 
equivalence between firms defined by a correlation coefficient. Mea- 
sure 6 is the structural equivalence defined by Euclidean distance. 
Similar to the findings in my earlier work (e.g. Mizruchi 19891, the 
number of indirect ties through financial institutions is more strongly 
’ This measure is equivalent to a Pearson product-moment correlation prior to subtracting the 
means in computing the sums of squares and cross-products. When unit means are small, it is 
virtually identical to a Pearson correlation. In the present context, unit means are indeterminate 
because there is no limit on the number of candidates to whom PACs may contribute. Thus, for 
practical purposes, the means are approximately zero. Substitution of a Pearson correlation (with 
means based on the total number of candidates registered with the Federal Election Commis- 
sion) for Sij yielded results virtually identical to those reported below. The two measures are 
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associated with similarity of behavior than is the number of direct ties 
between firms. Several other correlations are of interest as well. First, 
the number of indirect ties through manufacturing firms, although not 
nearly as strong a predictor of similarity as indirect ties through 
financial institutions, is still a slightly stronger predictor than is direct 
ties between firms. Second, structural equivalence defined by a corre- 
lation coefficient is positively but not strongly associated with similar- 
ity of behavior. The correlation structural equivalence measure is 
strongly correlated with two-step ties (0.764). Recall that in Friedkin’s 
(1984) view, two-step ties should be treated as components of cohe- 
sion. If two-step ties are controlled when taking structural equivalence 
into account, as Friedkin suggests, then there is a limited amount of 
variation left for structural equivalence to explain. In other words, this 
finding confirms that whether two-step ties are defined as indicative 
of cohesion or structural equivalence is largely a theoretical issue, 
since empirically they are very similar. Finally, the Euclidean distance 
measure of structural equivalence is, contrary to expectations, posi- 
tively correlated with contributions to the same candidates. In other 
words, the greater the distance between two firms, the more likely 
Table 2 
Effects of measures of cohesion and structural equivalence on similarity of political behavior 
(OLS estimates with QAP probabilities) 
Independent variables (1) (21 (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.240 0.251 0.249 0.230 0.254 0.231 
(0.997) (0.949) CO.8941 (0.729) (0.979) (0.743) 
Direct interlocks 0.009 0.022 ** 0.028 * 0.021 * * 0.019 * 0.023 * * 
(0.236) (0.030) (0.083) (0.016) (0.096) (0.023) 
Indirect financial ilks 0.027 * * * 
(0.006) 
Indirect manufact. ilks 0.020 * 0.031 0.018 * 
(0.080) (0.162) (0.073) 
S.E. (correlation) - 0.038 0.030 * 
(0.293) (0.089) 
S.E. (mean distance) 0.059 0.068 
(0.313) (0.269) 
R2 0.049 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.007 0.011 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ** *p < 0.01; all probabilities are one-tailed, except those for the con- 
stant; probabilities below the critical level in the opposite-from-expected direction are treated as 
non-significant; N = 990 in all equations. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with 
quadratic assignment probabilities in parentheses. 
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they are to contribute to the same candidates. Although the correla- 
tion and distance measures should be strongly negatively correlated, 
their correlation here is only -0.167, a clearly significant non-zero 
association but quite small in terms of the overlap in variation (less 
than 3%). 
Table 2 presents the results of several multiple regression equations 
with various combinations of variables. Because I am dealing with 
dyadic data in which the observations are not statistically indepen- 
dent, OLS estimates are presented with quadratic assignment proba- 
bilities (Baker and Hubert 1981; Krackhardt 1988). 9~10 
Equation (1) includes the number of direct ties between firms and 
’ Controls for the remaining variables in the model tested in my concurrent work are not 
included here. Findings based on insertion of these variables into the fully specified equations 
suggest that the relative strength of coefficients of the interlock variables are stable across 
different specifications. Reduced-form equations are displayed here to simplify the presentation. 
‘u Quadratic assignment (QAP) is a non-parametric technique that adjusts the probabilities of 
ordinary least squares coefficients based on the extent to which the observed relations between 
variables deviate from the expected relations given a certain network structure. QAP begins by 
producing all possible permutations of the matrix for the exogenous variables (re-ordering the 
rows and columns while preserving the original structure of the matrix). The coefficient for the 
effect of the exogenous variables on similarity is then computed for each permutation. Because 
the number of possible permutations is N! (where N is the number of nodes in the network, in 
this case 45!), it is not feasible to examine all permutations in most cases. Where N equals 10, 
for example, there are more than 3.6 million possible permutations. Mantel (1967) developed a 
solution for the mean and standard deviation of all possible coefficients, provided that the 
distribution of coefficients is normal. Given a normal distribution, the probability of the 
observed coefficient can be computed from a Z-score based on its number of standard 
deviations from the mean. If the distribution of coefficients is not normal, however, the 
consequences can be severe (Krackhardt 1987: 178). An alternative is to randomly sample a large 
number of permutations. In the analysis that follows, I randomly extracted 1000 permutations 
from all 45! possible ones. The probability level of the coefficient is simply the number of 
permutation coefficients that exceed the observed coefficient, divided by the number of permu- 
tations plus one (in this case, by 1001). Krackhardt (1990) has shown that QAP produces 
unbiased estimates regardless of the degree of autocorrelation. In addition, because the 
technique is non-parametric, the dependent variable need not satisfy the standard assumptions 
of OLS regression. In the earlier study cited above (Mizruchi 1989), I accounted for network 
autocorrelation by creating dummy variables for each firm and inserting them into the equation 
along with the network variables [an approach known as least squares with dummy variables 
(LSDV)]. Krackhardt (1989) has shown, however, that LSDV may be less effective than QAP as 
a means of removing autocorrelation. A reanalysis of data from my earlier study using QAP 
instead of LSDV produced virtually identical substantive conclusions. See Mizruchi (1992: ch. 5 
and the appendix to ch. 6) for an extensive discussion of this issue. A permutation QAP routine 
is available on the most recent version of UCINET. 
MS. Mizmchi / Cohesion, equbalence, and similarity of behavior 289 
their indirect ties through financial institutions, the variable employed 
in the models tested in my earlier study (Mizruchi 1989). l1 Consistent 
with the findings in that study, indirect ties through financial institu- 
tions is a significant predictor of similarity of political behavior but 
direct ties is not significant. Because Friedkin’s suggestion to control 
for two-step ties concerns only ties among firms in the focal network, I 
shall focus my attention on indirect ties through manufacturing firms 
(variable 41 for the duration of this analysis. Equation (2) includes the 
number of direct ties and indirect ties through the other manufactur- 
ing firms in the sample. In this case, both coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant (if a 0.10 probability level is employed) but the 
effect of direct ties is stronger. In the OLS equation, indirect ties had 
a stronger effect but this order is reversed in the quadratic assignment 
analysis. When only ties among the 45 firms are examined, therefore, 
the effect of direct ties is actually slightly stronger than that of indirect 
ties. 
In Equation (3) the correlation measure of structural equivalence is 
added to the variables from Equation (2). Including the correlation 
measure of structural equivalence in the same equation with indirect 
manufacturing ties is a precarious enterprise given the 0.76 correlation 
between them. This might explain why the effect of the correlation 
measure of structural equivalence is not only insignificant, but actually 
in the opposite-from-expected direction. The effects of direct and 
indirect ties remain positive, but only that of direct ties is statistically 
significant (and even there only at the 0.10 probability level). Equation 
(41 is identical to Equation (3) except that the Euclidean distance 
measure of structural equivalence is substituted for the correlation 
measure. The findings are similar. Euclidean distance is positively 
associated with similarity of behavior, exactly the opposite of our 
expectations. And this finding, unlike that of the correlation measure, 
is probably not a result of collinearity since the distance measure has 
only a 0.136 correlation with indirect manufacturing ties. The effects 
‘t The R’s in these equations are low even by social science standards. Three points should be 
noted. First, as mentioned in footnote 10, these equations contain far fewer variables than the 
fully specified model, the explained variance of which is considerably higher. Second, the R’s in 
analyses based on dyadic data have an upper bound of less than one, aithough the specific limit 
is difficult to identify (Hubert 1987: 124). Third, and most important, my concern in this analysis 
is not with the explained variance of the models but with the relative strength of cohesion and 
structural equivalence as predictors of homogeneity. 
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of direct and indirect ties are stronger in Equation (4) than in 
Equation (3) but that of direct ties still exceeds that of indirect ties. 
The findings in Equations (3) and (4) support Friedkin’s argument 
that once two-step ties are controlled, structural equivalence has no 
effect on the similarity of behavior. Even if two-step ties are treated as 
indicators of structural equivalence, cohesion (direct ties) appears to 
be a stronger predictor of similarity of behavior. 
Equations (5) and (6) of Table 2 are identical to Equations (2) and 
(3) except that indirect manufacturing ties have been removed to 
determine whether the effects of the structural equivalence variables 
will increase. Equation (5) shows that the effect of the correlation 
measure of equivalence increases sharply when indirect manufacturing 
ties are removed from the equation. The effect of correlation struc- 
tural equivalence is only marginally significant but it is about equal in 
strength to both direct ties in this particular specification and indirect 
ties when the latter are included with direct ties alone. The effect of 
Euclidean distance structural equivalence in Equation (6) is unaf- 
fected by the removal of indirect manufacturing ties. It remains 
insignificant with its sign in the opposite from expected direction. l2 
The fact that structural equivalence is not a significant predictor 
when both direct and two-step ties are included in the equation does 
not mean that structural equivalence is not an important predictor of 
similarity of behavior. Rather, it suggests that the existence of two-step 
ties between firms will contribute to their similarity of behavior, but 
the existence of ties to different third parties does not deter similar 
behavior. One reason for this might be that firms that are heavily 
interlocked in the system might have a tendency to behave similarly 
regardless of whether they are tied to the same other firms. The fact 
that, contrary to expectations, firms with high Euclidean distance 
I2 Burt (1988) has argued that simple entries for the number of ties should be replaced by 
entries for the distances between units. STRUCTURE contains two methods to compute path 
distances. One involves a fixed decay function derived from Katz (19531, in which the strength of 
the tie between two actors is defined by 0.5” where n equals the number of steps between the 
two actors. The other, a frequency decay function, defines a tie as 1 if the two actors are directly 
tied, 0 if there is no path between them, and I- fij/ni othenvise, where fij is the number of 
individuals that i can reach in the minimum number of choices needed to connect with j and nj 
is the number of individuals i can reach in any number of steps, including oneself. I recomputed 
the equations in Table 2 substituting both versions of this measure for the direct interlock ties 
variable. Overall, the results of these equations are similar to those in Table 2. The equations 
are available on request. 
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contribute to the same candidates, suggests the possibility of an 
additional factor that is affecting both distance and similarity of 
behavior. Perhaps it is not the ties between firms per se that lead 
them to behave similarly. Perhaps it is the fact that they are heavily 
integrated into the network regardless of their ties to one another. 
Firms with large numbers of ties in a binary network may have a 
greater Euclidean distance than do firms with few such ties. Even if 
the heavily interlocked firms are tied to one another, their ties to 
different firms will increase their distance from one another. 
Prominence 
One way to examine this issue is to control for the firm’s prominence 
in the network (Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991). l3 There are two ways to 
do this. The first is to standardize the relational measures to take into 
account the firms’ propensities to interlock. Interestingly, the primary 
difference between the correlation and Euclidean distance measures 
of structural equivalence is that the former measure is standardized by 
means and variances of the actors in the dyad (Faust and Romney 
1985). Therefore, all of the equations that include the correlation 
measure of structural equivalence have already controlled for the 
effect of prominence in this variable. The equations in Table 3 are 
identical to those in Table 2 except that the measures of direct 
interlocks, indirect interlocks through financial institutions, and indi- 
rect ties through other firms in the network have been standardized in 
terms of the geometric mean of the total number of ties of each firm 
in the dyad. 
Equation (1) of Table 3 provides results virtually identical to those 
of the corresponding equation in Table 2. In Equation (2), however, 
we can see that when the firm’s prominence is controlled, indirect ties 
I3 Galaskiewicz and Burt, in a reanalysis of Galaskiewicz’s (1985) data on corporate philan- 
thropy, found that cohesion was a stronger predictor of homogeneity than was structural 
equivalence when the two variables were entered simultaneously into an equation. When the 
firms’ prominence was controlled, however, structural equivalence became a far stronger 
predictor than cohesion. Burt has employed the term ‘prominence’ as a means of distinguishing 
actors’ prestige in an asymmetric network from their centrality in a symmetric one. Not all 
network analysts agree that centrality applies only in symmetric networks, however. I employ the 
term prominence here as synonymous with centrality. 
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Table 3 
Effects of measures of cohesion and structural equivalence on similarity of political behavior, 
controlling for prominence (OLS estimates with QAP probabilities) 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.247 0.253 0.253 0.226 0.255 0.229 
(0.991) (0.976) (0.847) (0.759) (0.983) (0.750) 
Direct interlocks 0.004 0.041 * 0.034 0.048 * 0.009 0.047 * 
(0.443) (0.061) (0.318) (0.072) (0.407) (0.081) 
Indirect financial ilks 0.512 *** 
(0.010) 
Indirect manufact. ilks 0.145 ** 0.121 0.149 * * 
(0.044) (0.284) (0.046) 
S.E. (correlation) 0.009 0.040 * 
(0.450) (0.058) 
S.E. (mean distance) 0.076 0.074 
(0.266) (0.256) 
R2 0.019 0.008 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.010 
*p < 0.10; * *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; all probabilities are one-tailed, except those for the con- 
stant; probabilities below the critical level in the opposite-from-expected direction are treated as 
non-significant; N = 990 in all equations. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with 
quadratic assignment probabilities in parentheses. 
have a stronger effect than do direct ties. When correlation structural 
equivalence is inserted (Equation 31, none of the variables is a 
significant predictor but when the Euclidean distance measure is 
substituted (Equation 41, indirect ties are once again a stronger 
predictor of similarity of political behavior (although direct ties are 
also significant at the 0.10 level). Equation (5) also reveals an interest- 
ing result. When correlation structural equivalence is inserted without 
controlling for two-step ties, structural equivalence is a significant 
predictor of similar behavior while direct ties are not. When Eu- 
clidean distance structural equivalence is substituted for the correla- 
tion measure, however (Equation 61, the effects reverse themselves. 
Direct ties become a significant predictor while structural equivalence 
has no effect. 
The second approach to controlling for prominence is to simply 
insert the prominence scores of the two firms in the dyad into the 
regression equation. This approach was originally suggested by 
Galaskiewicz and Burt (1991) in their re-analysis of data from the 
Galaskiewicz (1985) corporate philanthropy study (although the analy- 
sis did not appear in the published version of their article). Rather 
M.5. ~iz~chi / ~obesion, e~~i~alellce, and si~~lari~ of behactior 293 
Table 4 
Effects of measures of cohesion, structural equivalence, and prominence on similarity of political 
behavior (OLS estimates with QAP probabilities) 
independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.229 0.237 0.237 0.255 0.237 0.253 
(0.990) (0.948) (0.938) (0.492) (0.943) (0.526) 
Direct interlocks - 0.005 o.OiI3 - 0.003 - 0.002 0.002 - 0.000 
(0.303) (0.392) (0.442) (0.445) (0.464) (0.497) 
Indirect financial ilks 0.023 * * 
(0.023) 
Indirect manufact. ilks - 0.002 -0.011 - 0.006 
(0.412) (0.309) (0.313) 
SE. (correlation) 0.029 0.037 
(0.311) (0.355) 
SE. (mean distance) - 0.063 - 0.055 
(0.287) (0.309) 
Prominence (i * j)“’ 0.108 0.144 * 0.154 * 0.186 ** 0.140 * 0.171 * * 
(0.129) (0.065) (0.061) (0.041) (0.066) (0.034) 
R2 0.069 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.040 0.042 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; all probabilities are one-tailed, except those for the con- 
stant; probabilities below the critical level in the opposite-from-expected direction are treated as 
non-significant; N = 990 in all equations. Unstandardized coefficients arc reported, with 
quadratic assignment probabilities in parentheses. 
than standardize their cohesion and structural equivalence measures 
in terms of the number of ties of each unit in the system, Galaskiewicz 
and Burt inserted a multiplicative interaction term based on the 
eigenvector prominence scores of the two firms in the dyad. Burt 
(personal communication, 1990) has indicated that the procedure, 
employed above, of standardizing the measures by the actors’ promi- 
nence is superior. Nevertheless, the second approach yields an inter- 
esting set of results that deserve discussion. 
If Galaskiewicz and Burt’s findings are applicable in my study, then 
dyads that include heavily interlocked firms will be more likely to 
behave similarly than will dyads that contain relatively peripheral 
firms, even when the relations between the firms are controlled. The 
equations in Table 4 suggest that this is indeed the case. Prominence 
was computed based on the eigenvector computation presented in 
STRUCTURE (this computation is also available in UCINET). In this 
measure, prominence is computed as a function of the actor’s number 
of ties, the strength of each tie, and the prominence of the actors with 
which one is tied (Bonacich 1972; Mizruchi and Bunting 1981; Knoke 
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and Burt 1983; Mizruchi et al. 1986). The interfirm prominence score 
was the geometric mean of the prominence of the two firms in the 
dyad. The results in Equation (11, which include direct ties and 
indirect ties through financial institutions, are unaffected by the 
inclusion of prominence. Equations (2) through (6) reveal that when 
prominence is controlled, the effects of direct interlocks, indirect 
manufacturing ties, and structural equivalence, operationalized as 
both a correlation coefficient and Euclidean distance, became non-sig- 
nificant. The only finding of note is in Equations (3) and (51, in which 
the effect of structural equivalence operationalized as Euclidean dis- 
tance moves from non-significant positive to non-significant negative, 
the expected direction. 
With the exception of Equation (11, the only significant predictor in 
the table is the joint prominence of the two firms. The knowledge that 
two firms are heavily interlocked in the network provides a far 
stronger predictor of similarity of political behavior than does the 
knowledge that they are interlocked or structurally equivalent to one 
another, however measured. What is the substantive meaning of this 
finding? 
One possible explanation is that including a separate variable for 
interfirm prominence along with variables for direct and indirect ties 
is mathematically redundant. l4 Actors’ prominence scores consist, 
after all, of the sum total of direct and indirect ties in which they are 
involved. Including this variable in addition to the direct and indirect 
ties may thus amount to a double counting of the same phenomena. 
This is especially the case when prominence has already been con- 
trolled, as in the first approach employed earlier. On the other hand, 
since the prominence effect is a joint measure of the ties of two 
actors, there is no assurance of a perfect association between the 
actors’ direct and indirect ties and their joint prominence. To the 
extent that they are highly correlated, however, the inclusion of joint 
prominence could indeed wash out the effects of the cohesion and 
structural equivalence variables. 
The first step toward assessing this issue is to examine the correla- 
tions between prominence and the other exogenous variables. These 
are presented in column 10 of Table 1. Dyads with high levels of 
prominence are more likely to have direct interlocks than are dyads 
with low levels of prominence (r = 0.336). When prominence is con- 
” Peter Marsden suggested this point. 
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trolled, the effect of direct ties disappears. It is clear that prominent 
firms are likely to be interlocked with one another. This suggests that 
a dyad with two prominent firms is more likely to be cohesive. If so, 
then prominence is at least in part a measure of cohesion. Because 
the prominence effect dwarfs all others, including both measures of 
structural equivalence, it is possible that the strong prominence effect 
is actually a demonstration of the importance of cohesion. I5 
Equally intriguing is the fact that joint prominence is even more 
highly correlated with indirect ties through manufacturing firms (Y = 
0.515). Regardless of whether one interprets these two-step ties as 
indicative of cohesion or structural equivalence, the prominence effect 
is clearly tapping into these properties. These findings suggest that 
prominent actors are likely to be both cohesive and structurally 
equivalent. One possible exception to this proposition would be a case 
in which a system is heavily balkanized. In this case two actors that 
were highly prominent in the system might be less cohesive than 
actors that were members of specific subgroups. l6 In addition, lead- 
ers of different subgroups might be less likely to have ties to the same 
alters than will less prominent members of the same subgroups. This 
suggests that prominence will be associated with both cohesion and 
structural equivalence in cases in which the network as a whole is 
stratified hierarchically but is without distinct subgroups. Finally, the 
fact that dyads involving prominent actors are more likely to con- 
tribute to the same candidates than are dyads involving peripheral 
actors suggests the possibility that prominent actors play similar roles 
in the system that lead them toward similar behavior independent of 
the actors to whom they are tied. This issue is examined in the 
following section. 
Role equivalence 
The significant effect of prominence on similarity of political behavior 
indicates that firms that are integrated into the system will tend to 
I5 It could also be a demonstration of the importance of role equivalence. See Borgatti and 
Everett (1990). 
l6 In a study of interlocks among American railroad companies at the turn of the twentieth 
century, Bonacich and Roy (1986) found that the relation between centrality and power was not 
present in balkanized structures. 
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behave similarly even if (1) they are not tied to one another (cohesion) 
and (21 they are not tied to the same others (structural equivalence). 
Actors that are equally prominent within a social structure but have 
no ties in common may nevertheless represent similar social types, or 
roles. Shortly after Lorrain and White developed the concept of 
structural equivalence, a group of White’s students began to investi- 
gate ways of handling situations in which two actors played similar 
roles in a social structure; that is, they were involved in similar types 
of relations but not necessarily with the same alters, as was required 
by the concept of structural equivalence. An early statement of the 
problem is a paper by Winship, originally written in 1974 (and pub- 
lished in 1988). Since the late 1970s literature on this topic has 
increased at a geometric rate. Among the most widely cited works are 
those by Sailer (1978), Winship and Mandel (19831, and White and 
Reitz (1983). 
Considerable discussion has ensued about the mathematical and 
substantive properties of this concept, which has been labelled with 
such terms as automorphic, regular, positional, and role equivalence 
(Doreian 1987; Faust 1988; Everett and Borgatti 1988; Borgatti and 
Everett 1989; Burt 1990). I shall refer to the generic term here as role 
equivalence. Two actors are role equivalent when they are involved in 
identical types of relations with other actors. Automorphic equiva- 
lence, the name that Winship attached to the concept, is based on this 
principle. Regular equivalence extends automorphic equivalence with 
the requirement that actors have similar types of ties to alters who are 
themselves similar. STRUCTURE (Burt 1992) contains an algorithm 
for role equivalence. UCINET (Borgatti et al. 1991) contains algo- 
rithms for automorphic and regular equivalence. I shall examine each 
of these in turn. 
Triad census role equivalence 
The role equivalence routine in STRUCTURE is derived from the 
triad census (Holland and Leinhardt 1970). From the point of view of 
specific individuals, 36 types of triadic relations are possible (see Burt 
1990: 87). In symmetric matrices (all matrices in my study are symmet- 
ric), only six of these can occur. These are illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The STRUCTURE routine is based on an approach developed by 
two German sociologists, Hans Hummel and Wolfgang Sodeur (see 
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Fig. 1. Possible triad types for ego in which all relations are symmetric. 
Burt (1990) for a description). The triad census is done for each unit 
in the network, creating a frequency distribution of the actor’s involve- 
ment in each of the 36 triad types. Role equivalence between actors is 
then measured by taking the Euclidean distances between each actor’s 
profile of triad frequencies. 
We have already seen the difficulty of detecting the sources of 
similar behavior resulting from structural equivalence. Without knowl- 
edge of the motives underlying social action, there is little basis for 
knowing whether similar behavior between structurally equivalent 
actors is a result of common sources of influence or competitive role 
playing. Actors can be role equivalent, however, without being tied to 
the same alters. If similar behavior occurs as a result of role equiva- 
lence, independent of actors’ structural equivalences, then the similar 
behavior cannot be due to common sources of influence. It could, 
however, be a result of common types of relations or similar types of 
relations with similar others. But these are characteristics of a social 
role independent of the specific alters with whom one is tied. The 
298 M.S. Mizruchi / Cohesion, equiuaience, and similarity of behavior 
Table 5 
Effects of measures of cohesion and role equivalence on similarity of political behavior (OLS 
estimates with QAP probabilities) 
Independent variables (1) (2) (31 (41 (51 (61 
Constant 0.241 0.237 0.256 0.262 0.258 0.245 
(0.9201 (0.9381 (0.492) (0.206) (0.4001 (0.7481 
Direct interlocks 0.024 * * 0.020 ** 0.025 ** 0.020 * 0.018 * 0.004 
(0.038) (0.043) (0.035) (0.0551 (0.056) (0.3681 
Indirect manufact. ilks 0.026 *** 0.020 * 0.015 
(0.006) (0.068) (0.145) 
Role equiv. (triadic) 0.123 0.123 
(0.092) (0.0901 
Role equiv. (standardized) -0.125 
(0.466) 
Automorphic equivalence - 0.0002 - 0.0002 - 0.0002 
(0.1231 co.1221 (0.2371 
Prominence (i * j)“* 0.114 * 
(0.0971 
R2 0.016 0.024 0.005 0.030 0.034 0.049 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; all probabilities are one-tailed, except those for the con- 
stant; probabilities below the critical level in the opposite-from-expected direction are treated as 
non-significant; N = 990 in all equations. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with 
quadratic assignment probabilities in parentheses. 
evidence here (presented in Equations (1) and (2) of Table 5) indi- 
cates little effect of role equivalence on similarity of behavior. In the 
analysis of Euclidean distance structural equivalence, we saw that 
distance was actually positively (although not significantly) associated 
with similarity of behavior. The reason for this is that relatively 
isolated actors will tend to have low Euclidean distances, since the 
vast majority of their relations with alters are zeros. Relatively central 
actors will, ceteris paribus, have higher Euclidean distances unless 
virtually all of their ties are with the same alters. For this reason, 
Euclidean distance structural equivalence was found to be positively 
associated with firms’ prominence. Since relatively central firms were 
more likely than relatively isolated firms to engage in similar political 
behavior, Euclidean distance structural equivalence repeatedly yielded 
null or opposite-from-expected results. 
The use of role equivalence, as measured by distances across triad 
type frequencies, as a predictor of similarity of behavior creates 
almost identical problems. This is evident in Equations (1) and (2) of 
Table 5, in which the effects of role equivalence are in the opposite 
M.S. Mizruchi / Cohesion, equivalence, and similarity of behavior 299 
from expected direction. The more role equivalent are two firms, the 
less similar their political behavior. Network analysts may have de- 
bated the extent to which isolates are structurally equivalent but few 
will deny that isolates are role equivalent. Because relative isolates by 
definition have their most frequent relations in triad type 1 (Fig. l), 
they will tend to have high levels of role equivalence. It is not 
surprising, then, given our finding that prominent actors are more 
likely to contribute to the same candidates, that the greater the role 
equivalence, the less similar the contribution patterns between firms. 
Highly prominent actors may indeed play similar roles in the system, 
but when role equivalence is computed in terms of Euclidean dis- 
tances between all triad types, relative isolates will tend to have the 
smallest distances. 
This finding again points to a difference between the political 
contribution data of this study and the adoption of innovation data 
employed by Burt. Burt found that relative isolates were less likely 
than central actors to be early adopters of tetracycline. Since the 
failure of two actors to adopt is by definition similar behavior and 
since relative isolates tended to have high levels of structural (and 
role) equivalence, both structural and role equivalence were found to 
be associated with similar behavior. In the political contribution data, 
firms were defined as behaving similarly to the extent that they made 
contributions to the same candidates. If we imagine contributions as 
‘innovations’, then relatively peripheral actors (those who by Eu- 
clidean distance criteria are both structurally and role equivalent) are 
less likely to adopt. But common non-adoption is defined in my study 
not as similar behavior but as dissimilar behavior. This may account 
for my failure to find an effect of Euclidean distance structural and 
role equivalence on similarity of behavior. On the other hand, when 
actor prominence is controlled, as in the correlation measure of 
structural equivalence, then structural equivalence is positively associ- 
ated with similar behavior. 
What is missing in the analysis of role equivalence is a measure that 
would enable us to recognize the common roles of central actors. 
Substitution of correlation coefficients for Euclidean distances among 
triad types will not suffice, since the number of triad relations is 
already set to equal for all actors. A promising idea based on the 
Winship and Mandel (1983) model has been proposed by Doreian 
(described in Burt 1990: 96). In this approach, all non-zero triad 
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frequencies are set equal to one so that the existence of a type of tie 
becomes more important than the number of such ties. Application of 
this transformation to my data suggests that this idea is a potentially 
fruitful one. The transformed measure of role equivalence has a 
simple correlation of 0.467 with ordinary role equivalence. Unlike the 
latter, however, the transformed measure of role equivalence has the 
expected negative correlations with several other variables, including 
joint firm prominence ( - 0.3341, direct interlocks ( - 0.187), indirect 
manufacturing ties ( - 0.245) and correlation structural equivalence 
( - 0.166). Its correlation with similar political behavior is also negative 
(the expected direction) but virtually zero (-0.020; note the similar 
partial effect in Equation (3) of Table 5). Thus, although the Doreian 
modification of role equivalence is theoretically appealing, the empiri- 
cal results based on it only partially conform to our theoretical 
expectations. 
Automorphic equivalence 
Another approach that is closer to capturing the common roles of 
central actors is the automorphic equivalence routine in UCINET. l7 
This routine contains two similar algorithms. In MAXSIM, which is 
employed here, actors’ relations (geodesic distances) with others are 
arranged from strongest (closest) to weakest (farthest). Actors that are 
close to similar numbers of other actors will thus have high levels of 
automorphic equivalence. At the same time, relative isolates, which 
are far from other actors, may have greater distances from one 
another than do relatively central actors. This suggests that MAXSIM 
may generate central actors that are more similar to one another than 
are peripheral actors. In fact, my findings using MAXSIM reveal a 
weak but marginally significant association in the expected direction 
between automorphic equivalence and similarity of political behavior. 
The bivariate correlation between MAXSIM-based automorphic 
” The UCINET program for regular equivalence (referred to as “REGE” in an earlier 
incarnation) has posed computational and interpretive difficulties when employed with symmet- 
ric matrices (Doreian 1987, 1988; Borgatti 1988). An attempt to use the algorithm with the 
symmetric matrices in my data failed to yield a meaningful solution. Krackhardt (1986) provides 
one of the few empirical applications of regular equivalence. 
M.S. Mizruchi / Cohesion, equivalence, and similarity of behavior 301 
equivalence and similarity of behavior is - 0.164. I8 Only the correla- 
tions between similar behavior and indirect financial interlocks and 
joint prominence are higher. All of the remaining measures of cohe- 
sion and structural equivalence have lower correlations with similar 
behavior. On the other hand, the effect of automorphic equivalence 
becomes marginally non-significant when included in a regression 
equation with direct interlocks controlled (Equation (4) of Table 5) 
and the effect disappears almost entirely when indirect ties and 
prominence are controlled (Equations (5) and (6) of Table 5). Al- 
though the MAXSIM-generated measure of automorphic equivalence 
provides another promising approach toward identifying a promi- 
nence-based role equivalence, it yields equivocal results with my data 
on corporate political behavior. 
A prominence-based distinction 
Regardless of which measure of equivalence one employs, if relatively 
central actors behave more similarly than do relative isolates, one is 
unlikely to find a positive association between equivalence (structural 
or role) and similar behavior. The correlation-based measure of struc- 
tural equivalence and the UCINET MAXSIM measure of automor- 
phic equivalence yield associations in the expected direction. But 
neither is able to predict similar behavior in a multiple regression 
equation as do cohesion and correlation-based structural equivalence. 
As mentioned above, the fact that prominence itself appears to 
contribute to similar behavior in these data suggests that the joint 
prominence of actors, even those who are neither cohesive nor struc- 
turally equivalent, captures a form of role equivalence. But no existing 
operationalization of role equivalence is capable of identifying this 
special social type. 
Perhaps what is necessary is to distinguish between what I shall 
term central role equivalence and peripheral role equivalence. To the 
extent that a pair of actors simultaneously occupies central positions 
I8 This negative correlation is in the expected direction since the equivalence scores are in 
distances. As is evident from Table 1, the MAXSIM measure of automorphic equivalence is 
highly skewed. I reduced the skewness by setting the small number of outliers to values only 
slightly above the remaining highest scores. This depressed the correlation but only to -0.147. 
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in a network, they can be viewed as centrally role equivalent. To the 
extent that a pair of actors simultaneously occupies positions of 
relative isolation, they can be viewed as peripherally role equivalent. 
The Hummel and Sodeur operationalization of role equivalence will 
virtually always capture peripheral role equivalence. But the concept 
of central role equivalence will not be easy to operationalize. One 
idea, to compute the difference between the actors’ prominence 
scores, will not work because the differences between any two actors’ 
scores will increase as either actor’s prominence increases. Therefore, 
the lower the prominence, the lower the difference. For now, the most 
suitable approach will be to define the product of the two actors’ 
prominence scores as the operationalization of central role equiva- 
lence. l9 This will ensure that dyads that include two highly central 
actors will generally have higher scores than will dyads that include 
one central and one peripheral actor. The only difficulties with this 
measure will occur in cases in which the distribution of prominence 
scores is highly skewed and the product of prominence scores between 
one highly central actor and one peripheral actor exceeds that of the 
product of two other highly central actors. One solution to this 
problem is to normalize the distribution of centrality or to employ 
ranks instead of actual scores. 
An alternative is to simply assume that the joint prominence of two 
actors is an important substantive variable in its own right, indepen- 
dent of its relation to the concept of role equivalence. The attempt to 
identify the extent to which the joint prominence of actors consists of 
components of cohesion, structural equivalence, and role equivalence 
is partly an effort to understand the substantive meaning of the 
measure. Since my data indicate that joint prominence is associated 
with both cohesion and structural equivalence, and since joint promi- 
nence can nevertheless occur independently of those two concepts, 
the idea that it represents a type of role equivalence seems to be a 
feasible one. This has already been suggested, albeit in a different 
context, by Doreian (1987). 20 The correlation of joint prominence 
with role equivalence lends further support to this argument. Based 
” This product can be standardized to a geometric mean, as I have done here, to reduce 
skewness. 
‘” Doreian provides a further discussion of this issue using Freeman’s (1979) concepts of 
closeness and betweenness centrality. 
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on the findings presented here, there is reason to believe that the use 
of actors’ prominence might provide a basis for an increased under- 
standing of social homogeneity, especially in highly stratified net- 
works. 
Conclusion 
I have examined the extent to which measures of cohesion, structural 
equivalence, and role equivalence predict the similarity of political 
behavior among large American corporations. The cohesion and struc- 
tural equivalence results are heavily open to interpretation. If one 
views two-step ties (ties to the same alters) as indicative of cohesion, 
then cohesion is a stronger predictor of similarity than is structural 
equivalence. If one views two-step ties as a component of structural 
equivalence, then structural equivalence is a stronger predictor of 
similarity than is cohesion, but only if a correlation-based measure of 
structural equivalence is employed and the firms’ network prominence 
is controlled. 
Where does this leave us with regard to the cohesion-structural 
equivalence debate? Clearly, the extent to which social homogeneity is 
a consequence of either direct ties between actors or indirect ties of 
actors with similar alters is an important empirical issue. But whether 
the latter is properly labelled cohesion or structural equivalence is 
primarily a matter of semantic and epistemological preference. Empir- 
ically, similar processes are predicted and observed by both formula- 
tions. If one is using a measure that empirically confounds cohesion 
and structural equivalence and one has no theoretical preference, it 
would be best to simply note that one is examining the role of indirect 
ties in the formation of similar behavior. 
Interestingly, the more prominent were two firms, the more likely 
they were to behave similarly, even when their levels of cohesion and 
structural equivalence were controlled. I suggested that joint promi- 
nence may itself be an indicator of a common social role. Existing 
measures of role equivalence, with the partial exception of the auto- 
morphic equivalence measure in UCINET, were not associated with 
the similarity of political behavior among firms, however. The joint 
prominence of the two firms remained the best predictor. Since, 
consistent with theory, existing measures of role equivalence tend to 
treat relative isolates as equivalent, I suggested a distinction between 
what I call central and peripheral role equivalence, with the former 
based on the actors’ joint prominence. Existing measures do a good 
job of identifying peripheral role equivalence. The task that awaits us 
is to devise a measure that is capable of identifying central role 
equivalence or, better yet, of distinguishing these two types. 
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